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Abstract 
The current study explored under what conditions young children would set reminders to aid 
their memory for delayed intentions. A computerized task requiring participants to carry out 
delayed intentions under varying levels of cognitive load was presented to 63 children (aged 
between 6.9 and 13.0 years old). Children of all ages demonstrated metacognitive predictions 
of their performance that were congruent with task difficulty. Only older children, however, 
set more reminders when they expected their future memory performance to be poorer. These 
results suggest that most primary school-aged children possess metacognitive knowledge 
about their prospective memory limits, but that only older children may be able to exercise 
the metacognitive control required to translate this knowledge into strategic reminder setting.  
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Development of children’s use of external reminders for hard-to-remember intentions  
 Prospective memory refers to the cognitive processes that enable people to carry out 
specific tasks at particular future occasions (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; Smith & Bayen, 2006). One may, for example, need to remember to buy milk  
on the way home from work, to return a book to the library next week, or to take a pill at 8am 
every day. To increase the chance of remembering to carry out these delayed intentions at the 
relevant time or location, we often set external reminders to aid our memory. Writing notes 
and lists, leaving items in conspicuous locations, and creating alarms on computers or 
smartphones are all examples of intention offloading, allowing people to improve their 
prospective memory performance (Gilbert, 2015a; Gilbert, 2015b). This capacity may be 
underpinned by a metacognitive awareness of one’s cognitive limitations: once an individual 
knows that they may struggle to remember to carry out a task, they may choose to offload 
their intention to the external environment by setting up a cue to trigger future memory 
retrieval (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). In other words, intention offloading can alleviate the 
cognitive demands associated with having to remember a delayed intention using exclusively 
internal processes. Although this behaviour is highly adaptive in everyday life (Hall, 
Johansson, & De Léon, 2013; Harris, 1980) and potentially unique to humans (Redshaw & 
Bulley, 2018), its developmental trajectory in children remains surprisingly unknown. The 
current study aimed to examine when children begin to utilise metacognitive evaluations of 
their cognitive limits to guide reminder setting. 
A wide body of research shows that children can begin to pass prospective memory 
tasks from as early as two years onwards, with performance continuing to improve 
throughout childhood and adolescence (e.g., Kvavilashvili, Messer & Ebdon, 2001; 
Kvavilashvili, Kyle & Messer, 2008; Mahy, Moses & Kliegel, 2014a, 2014b; Mattli et al., 
2014; McCauley & Levin, 2004; Redshaw, Henry, & Suddendorf, 2016; Spiess, Meier & 
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Roebers, 2015, 2016; Zimmerman & Meier, 2006). Kvavilashvili et al. (2001), for example, 
tested prospective memory performance in children aged four, five and seven years old. 
Children were presented with stacks of cards showing pictures of common objects and within 
these stacks were several cards depicting different animals. The experimenter introduced the 
children to a puppet character and told them that their task was to tell the puppet what 
pictures were on the cards (with the premise that the puppet could not see well). Additionally, 
children were told that the puppet was afraid of animals, so if they saw any animal cards, they 
should hide them from the puppet. Results showed that prospective memory performance 
(remembering to hide the animal cards) increased with age, which is indicative of the broader 
pattern in the literature. 
Previous evidence is mixed on the question of whether children’s prospective memory 
performance can be aided by the presence of external cues. Guajardo and Best (2000) studied 
preschool children’s performance in tasks that sometimes included reminders. For example, if 
the child’s prospective memory instruction was to press a button whenever they saw an 
image of a house on the computer screen, in the external cue condition they were given a 
photograph of a house that they could place near the screen. As expected, 5-year old children 
performed better than 3-year old children. However, the external cues did not improve 
performance in either age group. This may have been because the cues only reminded the 
children of the target, and not the action they needed to perform. Kliegel and Jäger (2007), on 
the other hand, gave 2-6 year-old children an ongoing task that required them to name a 
series of pictures, except for pictures of apples that were to be placed into a box instead (the 
prospective memory task). Even children as young as three were more likely to place apple 
pictures into the box when there was an external reminder of the required action (i.e., the box 
was placed in front of them rather than behind them). Nevertheless, this result only 
demonstrates that environmental stimuli can improve children’s memory for prospective 
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tasks. It remains unknown whether children will choose to set their own reminders to improve 
future performance, and whether they will be more likely do so under conditions where their 
unaided performance is likely to be poorer (thus showing a capacity for strategic reminder 
setting). Strategic reminder setting may become increasingly important as children move 
through the primary school years, as they begin to take on responsibilities that require 
prospective memory such as routine household chores (e.g., make the bed before leaving the 
house) and school work (e.g., complete mathematics homework before Thursday). 
Gilbert (2015a) conducted several experiments to investigate adults’ use of external 
reminders for delayed intentions. Participants were presented with a computerised task in 
which they had to drag a series of numbered circles in sequence to the bottom of a box (see 
Figure 1). At the beginning of each trial, they were instructed that either one or three of these 
circles should be dragged to an alternative location (e.g. drag number 7 to the right when you 
reach it in the sequence). If they wished, participants could drag target circles towards their 
specified location at the beginning of the trial (e.g. drag number 7 next to the right side of the 
box at the beginning of the trial). This meant that when they eventually reached the target 
circle in the sequence, its location would remind them of the prospective task (analogous to 
leaving a library book at the front door to remind yourself to return it). Participants were told 
that use of this strategy was voluntary, allowing the experimenter to investigate whether 
participants created these external reminders by choice. Results showed that performance was 
better when there was just one target to remember rather than three, and that participants’ 
performance was improved when they set external reminders. Participants set reminders on 
the majority of trials and, most importantly, were more likely to do so in the more difficult 
condition (i.e. trials with three targets). In a similar study, Gilbert (2015b) observed that 
participants’ confidence in their unaided prospective memory capacity, independent of their 
objective ability level, predicted their propensity to set reminders. These findings 
	 6	
demonstrate that adults are strategic in their reminder setting: they use a metacognitive 
evaluation of their cognitive limits to behaviourally compensate for these limits when 
necessary (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Here, we aimed to examine when children begin to 




Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the intention offloading task. 
 
There is a long history of research into the development of metacognitive knowledge 
in children (see Schneider & Löffler, 2016, for a recent review). In some of the earliest work 
on the topic, Kreutzer, Leonard and Flavell (1975) interviewed children in kindergarten and 
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grade 1, 3 and 5 about their knowledge of memory and metamemory (i.e., how certain 
variables such as study time and the measure of recall can affect one’s performance on a 
memory task). They found that children of all ages had some knowledge about what makes 
certain memory tasks more difficult, but that older children understood more complex 
influences on performance, for example that retrieval of multiple items can be affected by 
relations between the items. Additionally, results showed that the older children were able to 
describe more effective strategies to improve memory. Similar age differences were found 
when Annevirta and Vauras (2001) tested metacognitive knowledge in a longitudinal study of 
children from 6 to 9 years old. They found that children’s metacognitive knowledge about 
memory, comprehension, and learning increased and became more stable as they aged.  
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between metacognitive knowledge (beliefs 
and knowledge about our own minds) and metacognitive control (use of those beliefs and 
knowledge to influence behaviour; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; Flavell, 2000; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). Indeed, metacognitive knowledge of one’s own cognitive capacities and limits 
does not necessarily translate into efficient metacognitive control of action (Nelson, 1990; 
Schneider, 2008). For instance, although children around 6 or 7 years of age can distinguish 
between easy and hard items to learn for a memory test, only around age 9 or 10 do they 
begin to allocate more study time to hard items than easy items (see, e.g., Dufresne & 
Kobasigawa, 1989; Lockl & Schneider, 2004; Masur, McIntyre, & Flavell, 1973). What 
young children appear to lack, then, is an ability to proportionately allocate cognitive 
resources to tasks they have identified as particularly cognitively taxing. One might therefore 
expect a similar pattern in a task like Gilbert’s (2015a): although young children may 
recognise the difference between easy-to-remember and hard-to-remember intentions, they 
may fail to set reminders strategically until they reach an older age.  
The Current Study 
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We slightly modified Gilbert’s (2015a) task to make it more appropriate for school-
aged children, while still maintaining the requirement to remember one or three specific 
intentions when dragging 10 circles to the bottom of the box. In the first phase children were 
not able to set reminders, whereas in the second phase this strategy was voluntary. Prior to 
each phase children predicted how they would perform when there were one and three targets 
to remember. Metacognitive knowledge of the relative difficulty of the three-target condition 
would be evident in cases where children predicted lower accuracy in this condition than in 
the one-target condition. Metacognitive control and strategic reminder setting would be 
evident in cases where children set more reminders when there were three targets than when 
there was only one. 
Consistent with previous research on the development of metacognitive knowledge 
and metacognitive control (see Schneider, 2008, for a review), our sample included primary 
school children aged approximately seven through 13 years. Testing children much younger 
than this would have been impractical, as basic competence on the task required participants 
to have an understanding of left and right, as well as an ability to make metacognitive 
predictions on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. Given that children begin to show some 
metacognitive awareness of their cognitive limitations during the preschool and early school 
years (Neldner, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015; Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2016; Schneider, 
2008), we expected that even the youngest children in our sample would recognise the 
relative difficulty of the three-target condition. We did not have any specific predictions 
regarding the age at which strategic reminder setting would emerge, although it might be 
expected to appear around age 9 or 10 given the developmental trajectories of metacognitive 
control observed in other metamemory tasks (Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1989; Lockl & 




The sample consisted of 63 children (34 males; 29 females) aged between 6.90 and 
12.97 years old (M = 9.86 years, SD = 1.70 years). Twenty one participants were aged 
younger than 9 years, 21 were aged between 9 and 11 years, and 21 were aged older than 11 
years. All participants spoke fluent English and most were of a white middle class 
background. Participants were recruited through one of three methods: seven were recruited 
through a University of Queensland developmental psychology database; 35 were recruited at 
a stall at a local museum; and 21 were recruited at a local school’s after-school care program. 
Preliminary analyses indicated that children’s age did not significantly vary with testing 
location (F(2,60) = 1.4, p = .26, ηp2 = .044); nor did any of the performance measures (overall 
accuracy, overall offloading rate, difference in offloading between 1- and 3-target conditions) 
differ according to location (F(2,60) < 1.7, p > .20, ηp2 < .06). We therefore collapsed across 
this variable in all final analyses. Ethics approval was obtained from the University of 
Queensland’s School of Psychology Ethics Committee and verbal and/or written consent was 
obtained from parents before testing.  
Materials  
The main intention-offloading task (see Figure 1) was presented on an iPad Air 2 and 
can be accessed from the following website: 
“http://samgilbert.net/reminder_development/start.html”.  
Measures 
Intention offloading task.  
Initial instruction phase. Participants were told that they would be presented with 10 
yellow numbered circles inside a box and that they could move these circles around with their 
finger. They were told that their job was to drag the circles in order from 1-10 to the bottom 
of the box, making each circle disappear (the experimenter then demonstrated how to do 
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this). Participants were then told that, as well as dragging each circle to the bottom of the 
box, they would be given specific instructions to drag one or more yellow circles to a 
different location in the box (either to the left, right or top of the box) instead of the bottom 
(see Figure 1). No specific instructions were given regarding speed of responding so there 
was no time pressure to respond quickly. 
Phase 1. In the first phase, participants were not able to move the circles out of order. 
The experimenter first demonstrated how to complete the task separately with one target and 
three target trials and the participant practiced these trials immediately after each 
demonstration. Six test trials were then presented, three of which had one target, the 
remaining three each having three targets (in a randomised trial order). Target circles were 
randomly selected on each trial, with the constraint that numbers 1 and 2 were never used as 
targets. On three-target trials, one target was randomly assigned to each of the possible 
locations (top, left, and right) and instructions were always presented in numerically 
ascending order (i.e. possible task instructions would be “drag 4 to the left, drag 5 to the top, 
drag 9 to the right” or “drag 3 to the right, drag 6 to the left, drag 10 to the top”). On one-
target trials, the target location (top, left, or right) was randomly selected. 
Phase 2. At the end of Phase 1, participants were informed that there would be a 
slight change in the next phase, in that they could now move any of the circles around the box 
at any time. The reminder strategy was then explained to participants. Participants were told 
that they could drag the target circles towards the instructed location (left, right or top of the 
box) at the beginning of each trial, and that when they reached this number in the sequence 
its location would remind them of the target instruction. The participants were told that using 
this strategy was entirely optional and they were again reminded of this during the practice 
trials. The experimenter demonstrated how to complete the task using reminders with one 
target, immediately followed by how to complete the task using reminders with three targets. 
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The participant then practiced one trial of each condition, before six test trials were presented 
in the same manner as Phase 1.   
Metacognitive judgment scale. 
After completing the practice trials in each phase (and immediately before completing 
the test trials), participants were presented with a computerised scale asking them how well 
they thought they would perform on the task. Specifically, participants were asked how many 
special circles they thought they would get right, separately for trials with one target and 
three targets. The experimenter demonstrated that children could drag the cursor on the scale 
from “none of them” (left endpoint) to “all of them” (right endpoint), with a number inside 
the cursor ranging from 0% to 100% depending where the cursor was located on the scale.  
Procedure 
Participants completed the primary task as outlined above, before being thanked for 
their time and compensated with a small prize. Total testing time was 15-25 minutes. Some 
(mostly older) participants completed measures of executive function after the main task, but 
most children did not complete these measures due to loss of motivation or time constraints. 
We therefore did not include these data in the analyses. 
Results 
Predicted and Actual Accuracy 
Predicted accuracy (as measured by the metacognitive judgement scale) was analysed 
with a repeated-measures ANCOVA including within-subject factors of Phase (1 vs 2) and 
Targets (1 vs 3), along with Age as a continuous covariate allowing us to examine whether 
performance across conditions changed linearly as children got older. The age covariate was 
mean-centred so that its inclusion did not alter the evaluation of within-subject factors 
(Delaney & Maxwell, 1981). As seen in Figure 2, this analysis revealed significant effects of 
Phase (F(1,61) = 8.4, p = .005, ηp2 = .12), Targets (F(1,61) = 89.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .59) and 
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Age (F(1,61) = 8.9, p = .004, ηp2 = .13): children predicted better performance for phase 2 (M 
= .76, SD = .19) versus phase 1 (M = .70, SD = .20), and for 1-target (M = .90, SD = .18) 
versus 3-target trials (M = .56, SD = .27); furthermore, predicted accuracy increased with age. 
There were no other significant effects (F(1,61) < 3.5, p > .06, ηp2 < .055). 
Actual accuracy (proportion of target circles dragged to their instructed location) was 
analysed in a similar manner. Again seen in Figure 2, this analysis revealed significant main 
effects of Phase (F(1,61) = 31.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .34), Targets (F(1,61) = 53.1, p <. 001, ηp2 = 
.47), and Age (F(1,61) = 18.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .24), along with an Age x Targets interaction 
(F(1,61) = 4.9, p = .031, ηp2 = .07). Accuracy was higher in phase 2 (M = .86, SD = .12) 
versus phase 1 (M = .74, SD = .15) and for 1-target (M = .90, SD = .11) versus 3-target trials 
(M = .70, SD = .18). Older children were more accurate than younger children, particularly in 
the 3-target condition (the 1-target condition was close to ceiling), hence the Age x Targets 




Figure 2. Predicted and actual accuracy measures in the two phases of the task. Error bars 
indicate 95% confidence interval for the within-subject comparison between 1-target and 3-
target conditions, based on Loftus and Masson’s (1994) method and scaled so that 
nonoverlapping error bars indicate a significant difference between means (Hollands & 
Jarmasz, 2010). 
 
Additionally, each participant’s discrepancy between predicted and actual accuracy in 
each condition was entered into a similar analysis. This showed a main effect of Targets 
p = .01
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p < .001 p = .009 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
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(F(1,61) = 14.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .20) but no other significant effects (F(1,61) < 3.2, p > .07, 
ηp2 < .052). Children were underconfident in their predictions for 3-target trials (M = -.14, SD 
= .25) but not 1-target trials (M = .01, SD = .21). There were no significant age effects. Thus, 
while older children both predicted better performance and did indeed perform better (as 
shown in the two analyses above), the discrepancy between predicted and actual performance 
did not change with age (F(1,61) = .21, p = .65, ηp2 = .003). This lack of an age effect appears 
inconsistent with previous results suggesting that metacognitive knowledge increases during 
the early school years (e.g., Annevirta & Vauras, 2001; Kreutzer et al., 1973). The children in 
our task, however, were able to practice the main task prior to predicting performance, which 
may have allowed the younger children to more accurately calibrate their predictions. 
Intention Offloading in Phase Two 
Offloading proportion was operationalised (as in Gilbert, 2015a; 2015b) as the 
difference between the proportion of target circles moved before their turn in the numerical 
sequence, minus the proportion of non-target circles moved before their turn. The rationale 
for this measure is that participants occasionally move circles before their turn in the 
sequence simple due to picking up the wrong circle by accident. This would not constitute 
offloading. By subtracting the likelihood of moving a non-target circle before its turn in the 
sequence (M = .04, SD = .04) from the equivalent number for target circles (M = .70, SD = 
.30) we can obtain a measure of offloading behaviour that is selectively directed towards 
target circles, corrected for any general tendency to accidentally select the wrong circle. This 
measure was entered into an ANCOVA including the within-subject factor of Targets (1,3) 
along with Age as a continuous, mean-centred, covariate. This showed a significant effect of 
Targets (F(1,61) = 14.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .19): children were more likely to set reminders for 3-
target (M = .74, SD = .28) than 1-target trials (M = .56, SD = .40). The main effect of Age 
was not significant (F(1,61) = .2, p = .66, ηp2 = .003) but there was a significant Targets x 
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Age interaction (F(1,61) = 8.8, p = .004, ηp2 = .13): the tendency to set more reminders for 
the 3-target than 1-target trials increased with age. These findings are illustrated in Figure 3. 
In order to visualise the results, participants were divided into three age groups: below 9 
years, 9–11 years, and older than 11 years (N = 21 in each group). The youngest age group 
set a similar number of reminders in 1-target and 3-target trials (F(1,20) = .005, p = .95, ηp2 < 
.001). By contrast, 9-11 year olds set significantly more reminders for 3-target trials (F(1,20) 
= 5.7, p = .027, ηp2 = .22) and this difference in reminder setting between the two conditions 




Figure 3. Use of reminders in phase 2. While younger children set a similar number of 
reminders for 1-target and 3-target trials, older children were much more likely to set 
reminders in the more demanding 3-target conditions. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals for the comparison between 1-target and 3-target conditions, calculated in the same 
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Metacognitive Knowledge versus Metacognitive Control 
Age did not correlate significantly with metacognitive knowledge, operationalised as 
the predicted difference in accuracy for 1-target versus 3-target trials (r = -.19, p = .13). It 
did, however, correlate with metacognitive control, as operationalised by differential use of 
reminders for these conditions (r = .36, p = .004; Figure 2). Supporting the proposed 
dissociation between these two measures, these two correlations are significantly different 
from each other (z = 2.8, p = .004; results were similar when the knowledge measure was 
based on either of the phases alone, rather than collapsed across the two). The correlation 
between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control, as defined above, was not 
significant (r = -.19, p = .13). Nor was there a significant correlation between metacognitive 
knowledge and task performance (i.e. the difference in accuracy between 1-target and 3-
target trials; r = .07, p = .57). However, there was a significant negative correlation between 
metacognitive control and task performance (r = -.30, p = .018): a larger difference in 
offloading between the two conditions was associated with a smaller difference in accuracy. 
One interpretation of this would be that selective use of reminders for the more difficult 
condition helped to improve accuracy towards the level seen in the easier condition, hence 
reducing the difference between the two. Alternatively (or in addition), this pattern could 
reflect increasingly selective offloading in older children, who also had a smaller 
performance difference between conditions due to a ceiling effect. 
Discussion 
The current study was the first to investigate the development of metacognitive 
evaluations and use of external reminders for remembering delayed intentions. Although the 
present paradigm involved only a brief retention interval between encoding intentions and 
acting on them, results were consistent with previous research investigating prospective 
memory over longer intervals, showing that performance increases throughout childhood and 
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degrades under high cognitive demand (Leigh & Marcovitch, 2014; Kvavilashvili et al., 
2008; Mattli et al., 2014; Ward et al., 2005; Zimmerman & Meier, 2006). Only the older 
children in our sample, however, engaged in strategic reminder setting in that they set more 
reminders under conditions of high demand. There are several possible explanations for this 
observed developmental trajectory. 
A first possibility is that the younger children did not set more reminders in three-
target trials simply because they were less willing to change strategies after completing the 
task without reminder setting in phase one. This explanation can be ruled out, however, by 
noting that the overall proportion of reminders set did not vary with age, and that even the 
younger children set reminders for more than half of the targets (see Figure 3). It is unlikely 
that they would do this if they were unwilling to change strategies between phases. 
A second potential explanation is that the younger children were overconfident in 
their abilities (especially in the three target condition) and, therefore, did not think that 
reminders would be useful to them. Inconsistent with this interpretation, however, the 
metacognitive judgement scores revealed that younger children were actually less confident 
than older children when predicting their performance; and children across all ages were 
appropriately more confident in the one target trials than in the three target trials. There was 
no significant influence of age on the discrepancy between predicted and actual performance. 
Thus, consistent with broader metacognition literature (e.g., Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; 
Neldner et al., 2015; Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2016), even the youngest children in our 
sample appeared to possess insight into the relative difficulty of the three-target trials. These 
results converge with those of Kvavilashvili and Ford (2014), who found that children as 
young as five can be highly accurate in their metacognitive knowledge of prospective 
memory abilities, despite showing overconfidence when asked about retrospective memory. 
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One remaining explanation for the results is that the younger children, unlike the 
older children, lacked sufficient metacognitive control to translate their metacognitive insight 
into increased reminder setting in the three-target condition (see Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; 
Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schneider, 2008). Both younger and 
older children in our sample were aware of the relative difficulty of the three-target condition 
(as indicated by their metacognitive evaluations), suggesting they possessed similar 
metacognitive knowledge of their cognitive limitations. Only older children, however, 
utilized these evaluations to inform strategic behaviour, such that they flexibly chose an 
appropriate strategy based on the cognitive demand of each trial. This interpretation is 
consistent with a wide body of literature on the development of metamemory, which 
indicates that only around age 9 or 10 do children begin to translate their well-established 
knowledge of memory limitations into efficient memorization behaviour (e.g., Dufresne & 
Kobasigawa, 1989; Lockl & Schneider, 2004; Masur et al., 1973). One implication of the 
developmental lag between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control is that 
simply making young primary-school-age children aware of cognitive limitations cannot be 
assumed to lead to the use of compensatory strategies (see Cherkaoui and Gilbert, 2017, for a 
related finding in individuals with autism spectrum conditions). 
The capacity to translate metacognitive evaluations of one’s cognitive limits into 
strategic action underpins many complex human behaviors, from recording information that 
is likely to be forgotten, to setting up contingency plans just in case the future does not turn 
out as one expects. The present findings point to a period of emergence for one instantiation 
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